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Farewell to Universalism: Nationalism and
Xenophobia After the “End of History”1
A b s t r a c t
The last few decades have brought about a significant change 
in the character of nationalism in Europe and, more widely, in 
the Western world. Quite paradoxically, nationalist politics is 
nowadays no more justified by appealing to biological or cul-
tural superiority of one’s own nation or by the belief in its uni-
versal historical mission (e.g., “civilizing through colonial 
rule”), but rather by seemingly more modest arguments con-
cerning equality, justice, right to difference, autochthony or 
even liberal democracy. This new defensive stance of today’s 
nationalism has allowed for a normalization of the right-wing 
political parties in institutional political life. However, it has 
not stopped xenophobia, but merely helped it to gain a more 
respectable face and spread more widely across the political 
spectrum. I argue that the rise of Western nationalism can be 
explained by the decline of universalism in philosophy, social 
sciences and citizens’ political sensibility in general. I also sug-
gest that xenophobia and nationalism are supported not only 
by explicitly differentialist concepts, such as postmodernism 
or pragmatism, but also by some unquestioned presupposi-
tions of political liberalism. This point is substantiated by an 
analysis of Fukuyama’s thesis about the “end of history” and 
of Rawls’ concept of international justice, in particular as to 
their treatment of the immigration problem.
Keywords: culture, difference, nationalism, universalism, xeno-
phobia
1     This text has been written as part of the project “Structural, Social and 
Historical Changes in Serbian Society in the Context of European Integra-
tions and Globalization” (No. 179038) of the Ministry of Education, Sci-
ence and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
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 Francis Fukuyama initially entitled his famous 1989 article with 
a question: “Have we reached the end of history?” The question is 
still debated, even though it has lost some of its provocative pow-
er. But in the meantime, the affirmative answer that was provided 
to it, seems to be proven more and more wrong: contrary to the 
expectations, contemporary world does not appear to follow the 
path leading to the establishment of the universal world system of 
liberal democracies, which, according to Fukuyama’s earlier views, 
marked the end of history as we had known it. 
The end of history thesis has been characterized by an ambi-
guity since its very beginnings, not only in Fukuyama, but also in Ko-
jève, and perhaps in their common source of inspiration, Hegel. 
These authors posited that universal history could be brought to its 
end, consisting of the state of universal recognition, in one part of 
the world – Napoleon’s empire or Western liberal democracies – 
and that the rest would eventually follow the same course. Howev-
er, as Fukuyama put it in his subsequent book, for the “foreseeable 
future, the world will be divided between a post-historical part” – in 
which all struggle for recognition has become superfluous – and “a 
part that is still stuck in history”, i.e., in wars, violence and aggres-
sion (Fukuyama 1992, 276, cf. Kojève 1969, 192). 
Such view of the transitional phase preceding the realization 
of the “universal and homogenous State” (according to the expres-
sion of Alexandre Kojève) is utterly optimistic and at the same time 
questionable, in the first place for general philosophical and politi-
cal reasons. One could hardly expect the post-historical part of the 
world not to be affected by conflicts in its tardy, “historical” part, 
and there are all reasons to believe that the relations along the 
fault lines between the two worlds would still belong to the realm 
of “history”, contaminated by its all-too-human passions. For exam-
ple, given the importance of the immigration issue, Fukuyama’s as-
sumption that “the historical and post-historical worlds will main-
tain parallel but separate existences, with relatively little 
interaction between them” (Fukuyama 1992, 277), does not seem 
to be realistic.
But let us put aside for a moment this objection and point to 
another important view shared by Kojève and Fukuyama, which is 
of more immediate consequence for our subject. 
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The end of history was supposed to result in an equilibrium 
state in which all substantial demands for recognition of rights are 
satisfied. Thus, it should have been the state in which nationalism has 
become insignificant and obsolete. This seems to imply that nation-
alism should be absent from those parts of the world in which histo-
ry has come to its end (the liberal democracies). Such was, indeed, 
Fukuyama’s conclusion: “The post­historical world would still be di-
vided into nation-states, but its separate nationalisms would have 
made peace with liberalism and would express themselves increas-
ingly in the sphere of private life alone”, whereas “[i]n the historical 
world, the nation-state will continue to be the chief locus of political 
identification” (Fukuyama 1992, 276–277, cf. Kojève 1969, 276). 
However, recent actuality does not confirm this view. On 
the contrary, for a couple of decades now, we have been able to 
witness an extraordinary rise of nationalist and xenophobic rheto-
ric – not only in the Third World or former communist countries, 
but in the most developed liberal democracies as well. In his first 
book, Fukuyama, in a way, acknowledged the existence of this 
problem. Nevertheless, he believed that nationalism essentially 
belonged to the past, and this view commanded his overall per-
spective when treating the phenomenon of the rise of nationalism 
in Western countries. Seen through the lens of the end of history 
thesis, nationalism was a minor and residual phenomenon, which 
was fated to completely fade away from the world (Fukuyama 
1992, 271–272). Also, in his latest book, Fukuyama accepts the 
conventional wisdom according to which nationalist politics in lib-
eral democracies represents nothing more than the “upsurge of 
old­fashioned nationalism” (Fukuyama 2018, xv), the revival or 
“awakening” (159) of the “ghosts of the older national identities” 
(145), or of the “demons” (153) of the past (so the commonplace 
metaphors go: cf. Kaplan, 1993). This frame of reference masks im-
portant features of today’s nationalism and obliterates its novelty 
and specificity. But it also minimizes the significance of national-
ism by confining its scope to one extreme of the political spectrum 
(the extreme right, or fascism). 
I shall argue that these two shortcomings are responsible for 
difficulties – theoretical as well as political – in dealing with nation-
alism. Nationalism of our days is significantly different in its 
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character from the earlier one. One of its main features is acute xe-
nophobia, which nowadays emerges in forms previously unknown 
to us. As a political sentiment, xenophobia is certainly not some-
thing new. However, its justification in the name of a differentialist 
ideology or human rights, as well as its normalization, are some-
thing unprecedented. 
One part of my thesis is that the rise of ethnocentric nation-
alism and xenophobia can be explained by the decline of universal-
ism in politics, philosophy and social science. Thus far I have ac-
cepted some of Fukuyama’s own conclusions. However, I believe 
that the decline of universalism is more comprehensive than what 
Fukuyama affirms. It does not affect only postmodernist, multicul-
turalist or pragmatist approaches, but political liberalism as well. 
Finally, I shall suggest that one of the main characteristics of the 
new Western nationalism is its relative independence from ideolo-
gy. This accounts for the fact that xenophobic feelings and atti-
tudes are much more widespread than we are commonly inclined 
to believe.
“Soft” nationalism?
To begin with, we may adopt the definition of nationalism 
by the German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, according to which na-
tionalism is 
a system of ideas, a doctrine, a picture of the world which aims at 
creating, mobilizing and consolidating a larger solidarity association 
(called nation), and above all at legitimizing of modern political 
power. This is the reason why the nation-state, with the nation 
which is as homogenous as possible, comes to be the central issue 
of nationalism.2
2     “Nationalismus soll heißen: das Ideensystem, die Doktrin, das Weltbild, 
das der Schaffung, Mobilisierung und Integration eines größeren Soli-
darverbandes (Nation genannt), vor allem aber der Legitimation neu-
zeitlicher politischer Herrschaft dient. Daher wird der Nationalstaat mit 
einer möglichst homogenen Nation zum Kardinalproblem des Nationa-
lismus.” (Wehler 2001, 13).
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To this minimal definition of nationalism, we should perhaps 
add, however obvious it may be, that nationalism is devoted to the 
promotion of the interest of one particular nation. As Hobsbawm 
said, in a somewhat exaggerated statement, “nationalism by defini-
tion subordinates all other interests to those of its specific nation” 
(quoted in Walzer 1990, 549–550). Another point which deserves 
to be mentioned is the importance of the idea of “homeland” in na-
tionalist discourse. Homeland is, usually, the territory of the na-
tion-state. But this term sometimes refers to something else: a na-
tive region, town or even neighborhood.
Obviously, these features of nationalism (homogeneity of the 
nation, promotion of its interest, attachment to one’s homeland or 
soil) are potentially related to xenophobic attitudes or feelings. How-
ever, this is not necessarily the case, and Wehler’s definition makes no 
mention of ethnicity or race, much less of xenophobia or even vio-
lence. So, we may wonder how this definition of nationalism fits to 
what is usually referred to as “new forms” of nationalism or, more 
briefly, “new nationalism”, in which xenophobia has come to play such 
a prominent role. But first of all, is new nationalism xenophobic?
Xenophobia may give rise to violence, and, traditionally, one 
of the main topics of the theory of nationalism has been the dis-
tinction between moderate or liberal nationalism and its extreme 
and violent counterpart. At first sight, and as far as the Western 
world is concerned, this distinction seems to have lost some of its 
pertinence, particularly in regard to the problem of immigration, 
which is one of the most important challenges of contemporary 
rich societies. More specifically, in Western Europe, extremist polit-
ical parties, openly inviting to violence against foreigners, have ei-
ther disappeared from the political scene or adapted themselves 
to the political system of parliamentary democracy, in which they 
have achieved substantial successes.3 This process of normalization 
of the extreme or far­right has been at work since the beginning of 
the 1990s.4 Its consequences have become obvious during the last 
3     The important question of secret connections between far-right political 
parties and illegal informal groups engaged in violence against foreigners 
may here be left aside.
4     The transformation of the old right has been rightly stressed in anti-na-
tionalist political agendas. Nonetheless, even in its new form, xenophobic 
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decade, with several emblematic events, such as Marine Le Pen’s 
taking over the former National Front’s presidency in 2011, the rise 
of populist nationalist parties in other European countries (the Al-
ternative for Germany party in Germany, Geerts Wilders in the 
Netherlands or the Northern League in Italy), Brexit, Trump’s elec-
toral victory and Matteo Salvini’s entrance into government. The 
result of this normalization has been the ever­growing difficulty of 
tracing a borderline between extreme nationalism and its moder-
ate versions. Consequently, the suspicion of extremism or racism 
floats nowadays even over liberal or moderate nationalism, or 
right-wing politics in general. This “confusion” has often been de-
plored by the moderate right (Taguieff 2014, 12, 175–177). Howev-
er, there is a good explanation to it: if acts of violence by political 
parties or individuals are not overtly supported or encouraged, it is 
only because of the assumption that the policies which de facto im-
ply resorting to extreme violence, such as the extensively con-
ceived tasks of the “control of national borders” or “war on terror-
ism”, should be enforced by the state. Merely conceded to or 
enthusiastically advocated, this view is nowadays shared by moder-
ate and radical nationalists alike. 
These changes in the political practice of far-right parties 
were accompanied, or preceded, by a shift at the level of the ideo-
logical foundations of nationalism, which made nationalism “softer” 
and hence more acceptable to a wider range of voters. Faced with 
the problem of immigration, new nationalism has adopted a new 
strategy, as it refrains, at least officially, from the old arguments 
stressing, e.g., the biological superiority of the white race. Its basis 
is cultural rather than biological, which suggests that it is more ap-
propriate to speak of cultural than of biological nationalism or rac-
ism (Balibar 2005, 13). But new nationalism does not necessarily 
nationalism is still labeled as “radicalism” or “extremism” (Minkenberg 
2013, 19): “This new radical right – identified above as the ‘third wave’ of 
right-wing radicalism in post-war Western democracies – is not simply the 
extension of conservatism towards the extreme end of the political spec-
trum; instead, it is the product of a restructuring of that spectrum and a 
regrouping of political actors and alliances. It is distinguished from the 
old right by its softening of anti-democratic rhetoric and willingness to 
play according to the rules of the game, as well as by its advocacy of 
ethnocentrism rather than classic biological racism.” 
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affirm the cultural superiority of one’s own nation either. The argu-
ment most favored by its proponents insists on the so-called “irre-
ducible difference” between nations and their respective cultures, 
as well as on the need to preserve national identity. As a rule, the 
second step consists of appealing to the principle of justice, stating 
the equal right of every particular nation to choose its destiny and 
protect its traditions and way of life. This change has become visi-
ble in the ideological discourse of anti­immigrant parties, like the 
Vlaams Blok, which rejected all accusations of racism brought up 
against it affirming that the political objective of the party consist-
ed of nothing more than defending “the right of Flemings to be 
themselves” – the same right it readily acknowledged to other na-
tions too (Betz 2003, 193). Surprisingly, in some cases, xenophobic 
nationalism has proven itself capable of accommodating to the so-
called constructivist conception of the nation (as in the case of a 
purely imaginary homeland, the so called “Padania” in Italy) or the 
multiculturalist rhetoric. 
At first sight, new nationalism is more modest than the tra-
ditional one, as it does not assign to one’s own nation any out-
standing, universal world-historic mission (a civilizing, cultural or 
emancipatory calling, as was previously the case with British, Ger-
man or French nationalism). New nationalism may be seen as a spir-
itual heir of postmodernism, as it abstains from any reference to 
grand narrations on the universal history of mankind. Victor Or-
bán’s vision of the Hungarian nation as a defender of Christianity 
appears to be one of the few exceptions to this rule; however, 
there are reasons to believe that Christian religion is understood by 
his party primarily as constitutive of a particular “cultural identity” 
of European peoples, which should be preserved as such at any 
price, rather than as an intrinsic spiritual value that deserves to be 
protected and promoted in its own right. 
Unlike its historical predecessors, new nationalism presents 
itself in the defensive stance of closure and retreat, not of expan-
sion or conquest. It seems to aim solely at preserving one’s home, 
one’s place of birth and antique traditions of one’s native commu-
nity. Instead of adopting the discourse of liberation, new national-
ism has developed a sentimental rhetoric of belonging in which in-
timate individual memories of one’s cherished region or village, 
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with its church towers and soils (les clochers et les terroirs, as in the 
case of France’s National Front), hold a place of honor. 
However, all this lyricism is nothing but the likable side of 
the more disputable practice of erecting interstate walls, barbed 
wire fences or even mine fields, which we witness nowadays. As to 
the question of immigration, the most important practical conse-
quences of new nationalism remain substantially identical to those 
of the same old right-wing politics: closing the borders for immi-
grants and refugees, hostile attitude to any form of blending of 
their culture with the one of the native populations, and discrimi-
nation. In spite of all changes in ideology, these practices still rely 
on xenophobic feelings of the domestic population, which are con-
stantly incited and encouraged. The effort to help xenophobia gain 
a more acceptable image is also a matter of sustained concern.
Legitimizing xenophobia
By its form, origin and meaning, the word “xenophobia” re-
minds of terms such as “claustrophobia” or “arachnophobia”, de-
noting pathological conditions which consist of a morbid and irra-
tional fear of something or somebody which a healthy person 
perceives as innocuous. However, the typical field of application of 
this concept is not the one of psychology, but of sociology and po-
litical science: xenophobia that we are dealing with is not a purely 
subjective feeling, but an omnipresent phenomenon with major 
political significance. Nonetheless, the “pathological” overtone of 
the term accounts for the fact that it is so suitable for disqualifying 
of political adversaries. But it is important not to content ourselves 
with using this concept as a denigrating label. While questioning 
xenophobic discourses, practices and attitudes, we should be 
aware of the weaknesses of some forms of fighting xenophobia, 
particularly of those coming from leftist politics. It is commonly as-
sumed that it is enough to state the xenophobic character of cer-
tain political attitudes and practices in order to make them repul-
sive or prove them wrong. To this type of criticism, one may 
respond with a question: isn’t a certain amount of xenophobia, af-
ter all, something human and understandable, or even constitutive 
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of the life in human society, which always consists of a more or less 
limited group of people?
It has been justly noted that, nowadays, “[x]enophobia is 
made productive, a necessity for survival. Its ugliness is made over, 
even beautified” (Amin 2011). In what follows, I will try to address 
some strategies of legitimizing xenophobia in Western societies. At 
the same time, I will sketch the broader theoretical context which 
has made the rehabilitation of xenophobia possible. 
Let us take a step back and recall the significant (and un-
lucky) historical episode from the biography of Lévi­Strauss, as re-
lated by himself. It concerns his lecture given in UNESCO in 1971 at 
the opening of the International Year for Action to Combat Racism. 
Contrary to the original intentions of the organizer, the lecture put 
into question the widely accepted view that “the spread of knowl-
edge and the development of communication among human be-
ings will someday let them live in harmony, accepting and respect-
ing their diversity” – the diversity which Lévi­Strauss himself 
considered as vital for the creativity of any culture: “if not resigned 
to becoming the sterile consumer of the values of the past […] ca-
pable only of giving birth to bastard works”, humanity “must learn 
once again that all true creation implies a certain deafness to the 
appeal of other values, even going so far as to reject them if not 
denying them altogether” (Lévi­Straus 1985, 23–24). 
Lévi­Strauss’ standpoint was understood and condemned as 
a deviation from the anti-racist consensus, prevalent after the 
World War II. This judgment was harsh and unjust. Lévi­Strauss later 
said that his intention had been to circumscribe the meaning of the 
term “racism” in order to oppose its abuses. Nevertheless, he pro-
posed an ambiguous distinction between racism and “the attitude 
held by individuals or groups that their loyalty to certain values 
makes […] partially or totally insensitive to other values”. As he fur-
ther explained (Lévi­Straus 1985, xiii–xiv):
 It is not at all invidious to place one way of life or thought above all oth-
ers or to feel little drawn to other people or groups whose ways of life, 
respectable in themselves, are quite remote from the system to which 
one is traditionally attached. Such relative incommunicability certainly 
does not authorize anyone to oppress or destroy the values one has 
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rejected, or their representatives, but within these limitations, it is not 
at all repugnant. It may even be the price to be paid so that the systems 
of values of each spiritual family or each community are preserved and 
find within themselves the resources necessary for their renewal. 
Lévi­Strauss did not even mention the word “xenophobia” in 
this context. However, his utterances were understood as meant to 
provide an anthropological foundation for ethnocentrism and a jus-
tification of cultural xenophobia, as distinct from (biological) “racism”. 
The misunderstanding was so influent that one of the outspoken 
adversaries of Western xenophobia maintains that Lévi­Strauss was 
trying to establish a difference between xenophobia and racism 
(Balibar 2005, 21). More importantly, some of the attempts to justi-
fy xenophobia or exclusivism as a normal and legitimate attitude 
appeal to the authority of the great anthropologist: according to 
Rorty, “we may agree with Lévi­Strauss that such exclusivity is a 
necessary and proper condition of selfhood” (Rorty 1991, 210, cf. 
Geertz 1986). However, Lévi­Strauss’ goal was rather to contribute 
to the preservation of the endangered native communities of the 
world, even if his conclusions were expressed in general and 
far-reaching statements.5 But we are nowadays witnessing a curi-
ous twist: the arguments which were originally put forward to pro-
tect native peoples, are being appropriated by the new nativist ide-
ology of the “autochthonous” or “indigenous” population of 
developed Western countries. The westerners are pretending to 
find themselves in the position of Aborigines or autochthonous in-
habitants of the Amazonian rainforests, whose fragile culture is al-
legedly endangered by the newcomers from overseas. But new 
Western xenophobia has nothing in common with the so called 
“primitive” fear before the strange or unfamiliar. Quite the con-
trary, given the colonial past of the West, we could see the new 
5     Lévi­Strauss’ famous distinction between primitive and modern societies 
in terms of the difference between anthropophagy and anthropoemia 
(from the Greek word emein, “to vomit”) represents a powerful tool for 
challenging the typically Western way of dealing with alterity by exclu-
sion or segregation: as a matter of fact, the new Western xenophobia 
could be considered as the supreme degree of anthropoemia (Lé-
vi­Strauss 1955, 463–4; cf. Taguieff 2001, 20–21), much worse than the 
cannibalism of the “savages”. 
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avatar of xenophobia as a symptom of the repressed feeling of 
guilt of the populations of former metropoleis in face of the dis-
tressed descendants of all too familiar peoples, which are now, in 
turn, being cynically accused of practicing a colonization “in re-
verse” (colonisation à rebours) (Taguieff 2014, 19).
This particularistic argumentation, which has been termed 
“fundamentalism of difference” or “cultural differentialism”, was 
favored by certain developments in sociobiology of doubtful Dar-
winian descent, with its thesis on the genetic foundations of “pri-
mary” racism, sometimes directly identified with xenophobia (cf. 
Taguieff 2001, 45–55). But it was also encouraged – the point 
which deserves to be stressed – by the postmodernist absolutizing 
of difference and correspondent denial of universalism, in spite of 
the frequent and sincere engagement of the philosophical champi-
ons of difference against racism and xenophobia. As Manfred Frank 
perspicaciously observed, it is difficult to conceive, in terms of 
sheer logic, how Derrida’s “differance” (la différance), which implies 
“a politics of differentiation”, could, for example, serve as a basis 
for the struggle against the injustices of the Apartheid regime in 
South Africa (Frank 1993, 132–133).6 On the contrary, it is easy to 
find in the “thought of the difference” the point of support for seg-
regationist policies, and this has happened more than once. 
Jacques Derrida honestly tried to fight nationalism and xe-
nophobia, but was mistaken in his account of their reasons. Derrida 
finds the roots of nationalism and xenophobia in the metaphysical 
heritage of Europe, with its concept of universal identity. The fol-
lowing passage from his book The Other Heading insists on the es-
sential affiliation between nationalism and universalism (Derrida 
1992, 72–73): 
The value of universality […] capitalizes all the antinomies, for it must 
be linked to the value of exemplarity that inscribes the universal in the 
proper body of a singularity, of an idiom or a culture, whether this sin-
gularity be individual, social, national, state, federal, confederal, or not. 
Whether it takes a national form or not, a refined, hospitable or 
6     Similarly, Terry Eagleton reveals a significant affinity between the spirit 
of populism and the postmodernist repudiation of universalism (Eagleton 
1996, 28, 63–68, 112–128). 
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aggressively xenophobic form or not, the self­affirmation of an identi-
ty always claims to be responding to the call or assignation of the uni-
versal. There are no exceptions to this law. 
Derrida’s verdict has not stood the test of time, which has 
confronted us with overtly and deliberately particularist forms of 
nationalism. Their proponents tend to refrain from any universalist 
argument, in the name of the pure diversity of human cultures and 
difference, which, however, entitles us to keep the newcomer as 
far as possible from the domestic population of Europe.
The right thing to do 
Similar consequences could be drawn from a wider range of 
philosophical positions which explicitly put into question universal-
ism. Probably the most telling is the example of Rorty, who be-
lieves “that moral values are just embedded in contingent local tra-
ditions and have no more force than that” (Eagleton 1996, 114) 
and advocates ethnocentrism in epistemology as well as in politics. 
The two aspects of ethnocentrism are interrelated. In terms of 
epistemology, Rorty adopts the viewpoint, which he explicitly la-
bels as “ethnocentric”, according to which “there is nothing to be 
said about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the 
familiar procedures of justification which a given society – ours – 
uses in one or another area of inquiry” (Rorty 1991, 23). Solidarity 
prevails over the scientific ideal of objectivity. This puts an end to 
any quest for universal principles. 
What is the situation like when it comes to politics? A com-
parison with a postmodernist may here be useful. In his discussion 
with Lyotard, Rorty accepts Lyotard’s thesis of the end of grand 
narratives, but reproaches him for rejecting the (presumably) non-
grand, ethnocentric narratives, those that help to establish the 
identity and cohesion of a particular nation, of a “particular collec-
tion of human beings” (Rorty 1991, 24). Postmodernism, according 
to Rorty, leads to relativism, which his own ethnocentrism avoids; 
no less than Peirce’s or Habermas’ philosophy, postmodernism is 
liable to criticism as being “insufficiently ethnocentric” (Rorty 
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1991, 23). Rorty believes that we are justified in attaching “a spe-
cial privilege to our own community” or ethnos (Rorty 1991, 29). 
On these grounds, he admonishes French authors, such as Lyotard 
or Foucault, for their loss of faith in liberal democracy (Rorty 1991, 
220) and, by contrast, openly endorses ethnocentrism as the ap-
proach that Western countries should adopt in their relations to 
the rest of the world.
It may be objected that we should not blame Rorty for justi-
fying xenophobia by his specific model of ethnocentrism. In a later 
book, Rorty expressly warns his readers that the ethnocentrism he 
is advocating “is dedicated to enlarging itself, to creating an even 
larger and more variegated ethnos”. Furthermore, it is an ethno-
centrism of liberal people “who have been brought up to distrust 
ethnocentrism” (Rorty 1989, 198). Nevertheless, Rorty’s viewpoint, 
with its apology of provincialism and even parochialism (Rorty 
1989, 73, 190, and Rorty 1991, 21–22, 26, 33), is strongly particular-
ist. Rorty’s “solidarity” requires an identification with a particular 
group of people, the one in which a person happens to be born and 
raised. In Rorty’s opinion, identification is subject to gradation but 
never actually reaches the level of the universal human being: de-
mands for universal or global justice are doomed to “weaken, or 
even vanish altogether, when things get really tough”, and give way 
to more limited loyalties (Rorty 2007, 42, cf. Rorty 1991, 200). It is 
difficult to tell this ethnocentrism apart from xenophobia in terms 
of the difference between “relation to one’s self” and “relation to 
others”. As has been noted, “the pair ethnocentrism/xenophobia 
[...] refers to two sides of the same process” (Taguieff 2001, 59). 
Rorty’s standpoint bears clear resemblances to some as-
pects of Heidegger’s philosophy: his insisting on the inevitability 
of ethnocentrism, to which we are “condemned” (Rorty 1991, 31–
32), on the importance of contingency, on the tradition to which 
one belongs, appears to be supported by a conception of finitude 
of human being, which makes us think of Heidegger’s 
Geworfenheit, based on ontological premises.7 However, unlike 
7     Rorty has disowned this interpretation of his views. He has admitted that 
his own ambiguities in expounding the concept of ethnocentrism may 
have contributed to the misunderstanding that it consists of “attempting 
a transcendental deduction of democratic politics from antirepresenta-
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Heidegger’s, Rorty’s ethnocentrism is deliberately subjectivist. 
Adorno rightly disputed such an attitude in the context of his gen-
eral criticism of Weltanschauungen, where he condemned our 
readiness to understand our “bonds” (Bindungen), i.e., the contin-
gent factual circumstances that determine our life – our nationali-
ty, religion or education – as our essential and irreducible attri-
butes, which are not liable to further questioning (Adorno 1973, I, 
125–130). But one may even agree with Rorty’s general philosoph-
ical outlook and still have doubts concerning its political implica-
tions. Let me give an example of this point, based on another, 
practical dilemma that Rorty formulated in a subsequent text, 
which may not be central to Rorty’s argument, but is nevertheless 
highly significant in our context.8 The dilemma runs as follows. 
Since the scarcity of the resources of the rich part of the world 
(Western democracies) does not allow for achieving both objec-
tives, which is the one we should opt for: preserving the demo-
cratic institutions of the Western world – free press, free public li-
braries, liberal education and all other “blessings of political 
liberty”, which require substantial financing at the cost of the rest 
of the world, or trying to solve the problem of global inequality by 
a worldwide leveling of incomes at the expense of the population 
of rich countries (Rorty 2007, 43–44)? 
Rorty gives no clear-cut answer to this question, but his 
overall standpoint – “liberal ethnocentrism” – strongly suggests 
that he inclines to the first answer. And when it comes to the issue 
of the right way of achieving an understanding between the Western 
world and other cultures, he merely substitutes his new method of 
“persuasion” of the advantages of Western liberal values and 
Western way of life for the old arguments tending to establish 
their superior rationality. Rorty does not even address the prob-
lem of immigration of the population of the Third World to the de-
veloped countries: his objective lies solely in demasking the hypo­
crisy of American companies which justify their transfer of capital 
tional premises”, i.e., from the concept of “human finitude”, while it is 
nothing more than “a reference to a particular ethnos” – the one of “the 
rich North Atlantic democracies” (Rorty 1991, 14–15).
8     On this point, I owe much to an author who has explained Trump’s elec-
toral victory in terms of Rorty’s “gentle” ethnocentrism (Looper 2016).
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from rich countries to the Third World by appealing to the princi-
ple of justice extended to humanity as a whole, which should have 
moral precedence over the principle of national loyalty to their fel-
low American citizens; in this respect as well, his standpoint re-
mains strictly ethnocentric. However, Rorty’s general conclusion is 
that American liberals should incite the population of the Third 
World to follow the example of liberal democracies, to be “more 
like us”, while staying home. Rorty likes to emphasize his choice of 
persuasion, as opposed to violence or force, as the right means for 
achieving this goal. But it must be noted that he concedes that re-
sorting to “the threat, or even the use, of force” stays for him an 
option in critical cases where fruitful conversation proves impossi-
ble (Rorty 2007, 54).
Another problem is raised by the very form in which Rorty’s 
dilemma is presented: “What […] is the right thing for the rich de-
mocracies to do? Be loyal to themselves and each other? Keep free 
societies going for a third of mankind at the expense of the re-
maining two­thirds? Or sacrifice the blessings of political liberty for 
the sake of egalitarian economic justice?” (Rorty 2007, 43). We may 
wonder what the precise meaning of the phrase “the right thing” in 
this question is. It is clearly not the “right thing” in any universal 
sense of the word, but the right thing “for us”, liberally- and demo-
cratically-minded westerners. Now we may accept this point of 
view, but then we should also admit that, according to the same, 
“ethnocentric” premise, “the right thing to do” for the populations 
of the remaining two thirds of mankind – either distressed or sim-
ply eager for a better life – is to try to do everything they possibly 
can to force their way into the parts of the world which presently 
belong to the privileged portion of mankind. This looks as a much 
more natural solution to their problems than trying to imitate the 
West and implement, as Rorty suggests, Western values and ideas 
in their own countries, all the more so because they are constantly 
exposed to destructive influences and military interventions of ma-
jor world powers. However, if so, everything becomes a matter of 
force, which can go as far as terrorism, and not of discussion. And 
when this happens, as is precisely the case in our days, it becomes 
hard to stop liberal people from nationalist and xenophobic feel-
ings and policies. Rorty’s “gentle ethnocentrism” obviously allows 
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for the view that xenophobia too, under certain circumstances, 
would be the right thing to feel or act on. Justifying xenophobic at-
titudes could be considered the last of the “consequences of prag-
matism” – of the vast project of dissolving all overarching, universal 
moral principles. 
Pride and prejudice
Criticism of postmodernist and pragmatist approaches 
should not induce us to think that nationalism or ethnocentrism 
could simply be prevented by espousing liberal philosophy of uni-
versal human rights, as some would have us believe (cf. Taguieff 
2001, 298). 
This should be all the more stressed, as Fukuyama, himself a 
liberal, was right in putting into question the postmodern disavow-
al of universalism. However, one may wonder whether his own lib-
eral concept is capable of fulfilling the promise of universal and re-
ciprocal recognition. 
Of course, Fukuyama opposes nationalism, xenophobia and 
right-wing identitary politics. But one can be a nationalist even if 
one’s concept of nation is not based on ethnicity, race or religion. 
In Fukuyama’s first book, one of the main obstacles to universalism 
is the aforementioned assumption of the fundamental difference 
between the two parts of contemporary world – the “historical” 
and the “post-historical”. A preference for nationalism is also im-
plicit in his thesis that nation-states always presuppose peoples as 
communities that share “the same language of good and evil” – val-
ues, that cannot be reduced to rational choices, and are built “on 
top” of them (Fukuyama 1992, 213).9 Fukuyama believes that this 
9     Latent nationalism is also at work in Fukuyama’s historical account of the 
failure of the attempts to establish democracy universally: the main 
reason of this failure is “the incomplete correspondence between peo-
ples and states” (Fukuyama 1992, 212), which allowed struggles for par-
ticular interests to frustrate demands for universal recognition. Fuku­
yama does not say whether one should seek to realize the complete 
correspondence between peoples and states in order to make universal 
democracy possible. However, it is obvious that this would amount to a 
worldwide realization of nationalist programs.
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
309
statement also applies to liberal democracies, which embody the 
ideals of rationality and universal recognition. That is why he pro-
poses the following answer to what he sees as the central objec-
tion to his end-of-history thesis – the incapacity of the liberal state 
to fully satisfy the impulses of the ambitious, spirited, “thymotic” 
part of human being (human “heart” or self­esteem), as different 
and irreducible to human reason (Fukuyama 1992, 215):
For democracy to work […] citizens of democratic states must forget 
the instrumental roots of their values and develop a certain irrational 
thymotic pride in their political system and a way of life. That is, they 
must come to love democracy not because it is necessarily better than 
the alternatives, but because it is theirs. 
This solution to the problem seems quite close to Rorty’s 
ethnocentrism. Certainly, one could maintain that the value of the 
national pride is purely instrumental, as it ultimately serves the 
goal of liberal democracy, the universal recognition: in the same 
way as the citizens of Plato’s Republic, the citizens of the post-his-
torical nation-states would have to believe in an ethnocentric myth, 
while the universalistic goal of their state would remain invisible to 
their eyes, and this for the sake of its own realization. But if so, fur-
ther questions arise: would not this myth, or cunning of (liberal) 
reason, affect the seriousness of democratic and well­informed 
choices that people are supposed to make in their political life – in 
particular, the ones which concern their relations with the outer, 
“historical” world, such as the issues of immigration, terrorism or 
military intervention? And if these choices are simply to be dis-
missed as irrelevant, what are the consequences for “democracy” 
in the liberal state? Finally, would the citizens of such a state, hav-
ing forgotten the instrumental roots of their values, still be capable 
of seeing foreigners, who do not necessarily share these values, as 
their equals in dignity? 
Fukuyama has been aware of the challenge posed to liberal 
democracies by massive immigration since the beginning. But the 
ambiguous way in which he presented its stakes is highly instructive: 
the main “difficulty” that post­historical countries would face resides 
in justifying their restrictive immigration policy, that is, in finding “any 
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just principle of excluding foreigners that does not seem racist or na-
tionalist, thereby violating those universal principles of right to 
which they as liberal democracies are committed” (Fukuyama 1992, 
278, italicized by V.M.). Fukuyama’s depiction of the nearest future 
suggests that the principal task of the foreign policy of liberal de-
mocracies, apart from “promoting the cause of democracy” through-
out the world, would consist of protecting themselves from external 
threats and risks which come from the “historical” part of the world, 
for example, in “insulating” the regions of conflict, such as that of 
former Yugoslavia, from “larger questions of European security” 
(Fukuyama 1992, 274). Hence the relevance of realism “as a prescrip-
tive doctrine”: “[t]he historical half of the world persists in operating 
according to realist principles, and the post­historical half must make 
use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history” 
(Fukuyama 1992, 279). But this is to say that the “post­historical” 
part of the world, contrary to the initial assumption, remains “stuck 
in history” too. These are clearly some elements of politics of nation-
al interest, not of universal recognition.
The realistic aspect of Fukuyama’s liberalism has lately come 
even more to the fore. Fukuyama’s latest book conveys a sustained 
critique of differentialist identity politics and multiculturalism. 
However, the main object of this critique are the obstacles which 
particularism poses to the effective functioning of the nation­state, 
rather than to the fulfillment of “universal liberal values”. 
Fukuyama acknowledges the advantages of societal diversity, but 
seeks to limit its scope. Although psychologically understandable in 
terms of challenges which modernization poses to individual hu-
man beings, demands for recognition of particular, marginal identi-
ties – the same ones that have opened the back door to the revival 
of “white nationalism” and the rise of the political right – should, 
according to Fukuyama, give way to the more important goal of 
building comprehensive national identities. It is true that Fukuyama 
says that the latter should be “broader” and “built around liberal 
and democratic political values” (Fukuyama 2018, 128, cf. 165–
166). However, he does not assume that the role of national identi-
ties is only instrumental, as he did before: the “end of history”, the 
establishment of the “universal and homogenous state”, is no more 
a serious issue for him.
ed
ited
 vo
lum
es
311
Contrary to his earlier predictions, Fukuyama now suggests 
that the nation-state is fated to remain “the chief locus of political 
identification”, not only in the historical, but also in the post­histori-
cal part of the world. Some of his arguments sound outright 
Hobbesian, with “national identity” taking the place of “sovereign-
ty”: “The extreme example of what can happen absent national 
identity is state breakdown and civil war” (Fukuyama 2018, 128). On 
the positive side, Fukuyama appears to think that the nation­state 
represents the sole viable and ultimate framework of political order 
“both at home and internationally”, which probably means, of politi-
cal life in general (Fukuyama 2018, 139). This is the reason why his 
interest shifts, internally, to the question of who “the people” of a 
given nation-state are, which amounts to distinguishing citizens 
from non-citizens, and to the one of adopting the best model of in-
tegration of foreign people from other cultures; externally, to put-
ting in place the most effective policies to bar unwanted immigra-
tion. Needless to say, the two levels are interconnected, and 
Fukuyama’s conclusions are restrictive in both cases. As effective 
states presuppose shared and well­defined identity (we are remind-
ed that it was forged, in the case of European nations, by authoritar-
ian means and violence), and given the failure of the multiculturalist 
approach to secure integration, Fukuyama feels entitled to advo-
cate a “policy focus” on good old “assimilation” (Fukuyama 2018, 
174, 177–178). He also mistrusts dual citizenship, which is prone to 
provoke conflict of loyalties, especially in the case of a war between 
the states to which allegiance is due (Fukuyama 2018, 168–169). As 
to the issue of immigration, he insists on the indisputable right of 
liberal democracies to protect their own borders (Fukuyama 2018, 
175), as well as on the purely “moral” character of the obligation for 
developed countries “to shelter refugees and welcome immi-
grants”: being “potentially costly both economically and socially”, 
such obligations should not imperil their own interests and priori-
ties (Fukuyama 2018, 138–139). The right way for Europe to deal 
with the immigration issue is conceived of in purely technological 
terms, as “regulating” the flow of migrants. Fukuyama stresses that 
organizations charged with this task should enjoy better funding 
and political support, in particular “from the member states most 
concerned with keeping migrants out” (Fukuyama 2018, 175). 
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Political liberalism is not necessarily universalistic in the cos-
mopolitan sense of the word. This is true of Rawls’ version of liber-
alism as well.10 The theory of justice, as developed by Rawls, takes 
for granted the existence of constituted and mutually exclusive po-
litical communities (or nation-states). The scope of his argument of 
the “veil of ignorance” – which enjoins us to put ourselves in the 
position of the least well­off members of society when choosing 
the just principles of distribution of power or wealth – is restricted 
to such communities (cf. Barry 1975, 128–133). In The Law of Peo-
ples, the book which deals with international justice, Rawls almost 
entirely leaves aside what is often seen as the three most urgent 
problems of contemporary world: unjust war, immigration and the 
treatment of nuclear weapons. In particular, in his “realistic Utopia”, 
the problem of immigration is taken to be “eliminated” by the pro­
ject of encouraging potential immigrants to solve their problems in 
their countries of origin and assisting them therein (Rawls 1999, 8). 
Rawls insists as strongly as Fukuyama on the right of partic-
ular states to limit immigration. His main argument for this is the 
need to secure, for a given people, the possibility of a responsible 
treatment of their territory with “its potential capacity to support 
them in perpetuity” (Rawls 1999, 8); besides, there is a legitimate 
need “to protect a people’s political culture and its constitutional 
principles” (Rawls 1999, 39). Hence Rawls’ apology of interstate 
boundaries, however arbitrary they may be from the historical 
point of view. As to the practical strategies of solving the world 
migration problem, there is ultimately no significant difference 
between the views of Rorty and Rawls.11 When it comes to immi-
gration, Rawls goes so far as to endorse Michael Walzer’s warning 
that the world with an unrestricted right to immigrate would be 
the one of “deracinated men and women” (Rawls 1999, 39) – an 
10     Some authors have emphasized the progressive elimination of “univer-
salist presuppositions” from Rawls’ theory from Political liberalism on 
(Bell 2001). Rorty’s own attempt to “historicize” Rawls’ standpoint (see 
Rorty 2007, 47) corresponds to this trend in Rawls’ development.
11     Rawls prescribes a duty for well-ordered societies to provide assistance 
for the right of emigration, but not for “the right to be accepted some-
where as an immigrant”. He admits that this makes the right to emigrate 
pointless. However, he simply states that “many rights are without point 
in this sense” (Rawls 1999, 74). 
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argument that hardly fits into the set of liberal principles and val-
ues. Presumably, Rawls has here in mind the merits of American 
system of locally rooted democracy, which cannot be denied. 
However, in spite of his claim that The Law of Peoples is not ethno-
centric (Rawls 1999, 121), the point of view expounded in this 
book could easily slip into ethnocentrism when, as Rorty said, 
“things get really tough”, making the loyalty to one’s own people 
matter more than justice. 
Rawlsian approach is not overtly xenophobic, even if the very 
name of “decent” (non-liberal) peoples may sound slightly deroga-
tory. But certain “national preference” is implicit in Rawls’ disregard 
of the issue of distributive justice between peoples, as well as in his 
restriction of the principle of equal opportunity to a “liberal domes-
tic society”. Global equality of opportunity, as opposed to the na-
tional one, “is not a significant issue” for Rawls, since “it conflicts 
with the right of national self­determination” (Milanović 2016, 139, 
cf. Rawls 1999, 113–120). It has been rightly noted that this argu-
ment represents an ad hoc limitation of the principle of equal op-
portunity (Milanović 2016, 125–139). Rawls’ liberalism could certain-
ly be corrected at this point, and some of the attempts to establish 
the universal validity of the principle of equal opportunity have 
been inspired by his own theory of justice (Pogge 1989 and 1994). 
But the question of global justice should be conceived still more 
broadly. When dealing with it, we should also take into account the 
increased responsibility of the richest countries in the world – of co-
lonial powers of the past, as well as of superpowers of today. 
The idea of liberal democracy per se cannot prevent nation-
alism or xenophobia. As Ash Amin said, the problem of nowadays 
Europe – to which we may add: of all rich Western democracies – 
lies precisely in that it is “at once xenophobic and liberal” (Amin 
2011). As has often been stressed, contemporary liberalism is in-
consequent, as it puts harsh limits on the circulation of people be-
tween different parts of the world, while advocating the free flow 
of capital, merchandise and ideas. However, in Western societies, 
the very distinction between those who are inside and those who 
are outside gives rise to nationalism, regardless of the difference 
between arguments that are being put forward. 
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Nationalism and xenophobia do not necessarily involve con-
fessing oneself to be a nationalist, or the explicit belief that one’s 
nation is superior to others. They are manifest in the choices we 
make in critical cases, such as the decision to let the refugees 
drown in the Mediterranean, or even fire missiles at their boats, in 
order to prevent them from compromising our exclusive right to 
enjoy the benefits of the national security system and disturbing 
our daily life (cf. Hopkins 2015). In particular, as I would venture to 
say, the question of new nationalism is only superficially the one of 
different cultural backgrounds and values. At a deeper level, it is 
the question of the refusal of the populations of rich liberal de-
mocracies to make decisions which imperil their own well­being. 
Above all, new nationalism is welfare chauvinism, which is all about 
defending one’s right to the “citizenship rent”, the premium due to 
one’s being born in the right country (Milanović 2016, 132–136, 
231). It is much less caused by the fear of losing one’s cultural iden-
tity.12 In our “post-historical” world, xenophobia and nationalism 
function, so to say, pre­reflexively, as they can do without discours-
es or ideologies. Ulrich Wehler has stated that one of the most sa-
lient features of nationalism is its extraordinary capacity to accom-
modate all sorts of political regimes and constitutions (Wehler 
2001, 50). To this we might add: all sorts of ideologies, and even 
the absence of any ideology.
Are alternative, non-xenophobic scenarios at least imagin-
able? The futuristic novel of the ill­famed French author, Michel 
Houellebecq, Soumission, offers one of them: it conveys a dystopian 
depiction of a Western country whose native elites have perfectly 
adapted to their new condition of converted Muslims, in spite of all 
cultural differences, as they manage to satisfy, in the new Islamic 
republic of France, their self-interest, even better than before 
(Houellebecq 2015). 
12     For a different view, see, for example, Kymlicka 2015.
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